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224

Ulrich Kühn

# The Rise and Fall of Cooperative Arms Control in Europe



Nomos



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For there is no durable treaty which is not founded on reciprocal advantage, and indeed a treaty which does not satisfy this condition is no treaty at all, and is apt to contain the seeds of its own dissolution.

François de Callieres, On the Manner of Negotiating With Princes (1716), translated by A. F. Whyte (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1919), pp. 109-10

Political action must be based on a coordination of morality and power.

Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-1939. An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1939), p. 97

The only remedy for a strong structural effect is a structural change.

Kenneth Neal Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1979), p. 111

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This book is dedicated to my beloved aunt Christel and my uncle Werner whom I miss.

Hamburg, 2019

#### **Abbreviations**

ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
ACFE Agreement on Adaptation of CFE

A/CFE meaning the CFE Treaty and the Agreement on Adaptation

of CFE

AIAM Annual Implementation Assessment Meeting

APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

ATTU Atlantic to the Urals

CAC Conventional Arms Control in Europe

CBM Confidence-Building Measures

CDE Conference on CSBMs and Disarmament in Europe
CFE Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

CFE-1A Concluding Act of the Negotiation on Personnel Strength of

**CFE** 

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CIS Commonwealth of Independent States

C/OSCE Meaning CSCE and OSCE
COW Correlates of War Index
CPC Conflict Prevention Centre

CSBM Confidence- and Security-Building Measures

CSCE Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe

CST Treaty on Collective Security

CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization CTBT Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

EAPC Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council

EC European Community

EPAA European Phased Adaptive Approach

ES English School

ESDP European Security and Defense Policy

EST European Security Treaty (Medvedev initiative of 2009)

EU European Union

FSC Forum for Security Co-operation

GDP Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product

GOP Grand Old Party (Republican Party)

G8 Group of Eight (see also G6, G7, and G20)

IDP Internally Displaced Person

IFSH Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Hamburg

IGO Intergovernmental Organization

IISS International Institute for Strategic Studies

IMF International Monetary Fund

INF Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces

IO International Organization IR International Relations

JCC Joint Consultative Commission MAD Mutual Assured Destruction

MANPADS Man-Portable Air-Defense Systems

MBFR Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions Talks

NACC North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
New START NGO Non-Governmental Organization

NRC NATO-Russia Council

NSNW Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons NTM National-Technical Means

ODIHR Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe

OSCC Open Skies Consultative Commission PC Political Committee (of NATO)

PD Prisoners' Dilemma
PfP Partnership for Peace

PJC NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council PMSC Political-Military Steering Committee

POL-MIL Political-Military

PPP Purchasing Power Parity
R&D Research and Development

REACT Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams

SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks SALW Small Arms and Light Weapons

SC Security Community
SG Secretary General

SMM OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty

TFT Tit-For-Tat

TLE Treaty-Limited Equipment

TUR Turkey

UK United Kingdom

U.S. United States of America

USSR Union of Socialist Soviet Republics

VD Vienna Document

WEU Western European Union
WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO Warsaw Treaty Organization

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